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COMMENT

THE LAW OF IDEA MISAPPROPRIATION IN NEW
YORK: AN ARGUMENT FOR CHANGE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The amount of protection against appropriation that an idea receives depends upon the jurisdiction in which a claim for misappropriation is brought.' For example, while New York provides a minimal amount of protection for the creator of ideas, California's
protection is practically the same level as that which it provides for
2
expressions of ideas that may be copyrighted.
The dearth of protection for creators in New York is largely
caused by the reliance of its courts on confusing and arbitrary standards. 3 These standards are inherently ambiguous, offer inadequate
guidelines, and, thus, result in a lack of uniformity for protection.
Consequently, cases with practically identical facts often result in
inconsistent decisions.'
5
Moreover, these standards are incredibly difficult to satisfy.
I. See generally Peter Swarth, The Law of Ideas: New York and California Are More
Than 3,000 Miles Apart, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 115 (1990).
2. Id. at 117-18.
3. Id. "[Biecause of the way the courts use [these standards,] they are no longer effective measures of protectibility [sic]. Instead, they serve as complete barriers to idea protection." Id. at 122. The New York standards of "novelty" and "concreteness" are discussed
infra at part 11.
4. Compare Healey v. R.H. Macy & Co., 297 N.Y.S. 165 (App. Div. 1937), affd, 14
N.E.2d 388 (N.Y. 1938) (finding in favor of the plaintiff where the defendant failed to compensate the plaintiff for using only the slogan developed by the plaintiff as part of an advertising campaign) with Bailey v. Haberle Congress Brewing Co., 85 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Syracuse Mun.
Ct. 1948) (finding in favor of the defendant where the defendant failed to compensate the
plaintiff for using the slogan developed by the plaintiff, but where there was no broader advertising campaign developed by the plaintiff).
5. See generally Nory Miller, Note, Selection Processes: An Inadvertent Gap in Intellectual Property Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1009 (1987).

HOFSTRA PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:427

Thus, the stringent and inoperative standards have wrought unjust
outcomes for many creators who have been forced to depend upon
the courts of New York to have their rights adjudicated. Furthermore, through their use of these poorly defined standards, the courts
in New York have exacerbated the problem by creating "loopholes"
for injustice. This unfortunate state of affairs will end only if the
legislature in New York addresses the inequities of the situation and
enacts appropriate legislation.
A case which exemplifies the ineffective and unfair results of
New York's standards for idea misappropriation is Murray v. National Broadcasting Co.6 Murray involved the alleged misappropriation of the plaintiff's idea by the defendant.7 Despite the marked
similarities between the plaintiff's idea for a television show and National Broadcasting Company's ("NBC") The Cosby Show, the
plaintiff was unsuccessful in his suit against NBC."
In accordance with New York jurisprudence, the court applied
the "novelty" standard to determine if the idea was sufficiently novel
and concrete to be afforded legal protection. 9 The court found that
the idea was not novel and stated that the issue of misappropriation
could not be litigated.10 Thus, the court's application of New York's
standard precluded the creator from partaking in the success of his
own creation.11
In contrast, California law requires that a court deemphasize
arbitrary and stringent standards, and focus, instead, on the relationship between the parties by examining the actions between the parties which gave rise to the litigation. 1" Such a standard provides
greater protection to the creator of the idea. 13 Therefore, if Murray
had been decided in a California court, the key question of who actually conceived of the idea for The Cosby Show would have been
heavily considered in the court's analysis. It is clear that such a standard of review is better suited to reveal the truth behind misappro6. 671 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affid, 844 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 955 (1988).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 237.
9. Id. at 239.
10. Id. at 245.
11. See id.
12. Swarth, supra note 1, at 127. "Instead of judging an idea by its value afforded as
consideration, [California] courts . . . concentrate on the existence of a contractual relationship, or lack thereof." Id.
13. Id.
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priation claims and is, thus, better suited to achieve equitable results.
The first part of this Note discusses the standards used in New
York in evaluating a claim for idea misappropriation and explores
the problems with these standards. 4 The next section analyzes the
Murray case, illustrating the difficulties in the application of the
"novel" and "concrete" standards used in New York. This Note then
compares the standards used in California for misappropriation cases
and suggests that New York adopt similar standards. 5 Finally, this
Note concludes by briefly examining potential ramifications of continuously allowing claims of misappropriation to be evaluated under
inadequate standards.
II.

THE PROBLEM WITH NEW YORK'S STANDARDS

FOR IDEA

MISAPPROPRIATION

A.

The Standards: Concreteness and Novelty

In New York, an idea must be sufficiently concrete before it will
be considered property entitling the creator to legal protection.' It
has long been held by the courts that there is no property right in
ideas that have not been reduced to a tangible and concrete form.' 7
The rationale for this is the theory that only the form of an idea
warrants protection, not the idea itself.' 8
In O'Brien v. RKO Radio Pictures,9 the plaintiff's idea for a
motion picture, built around a colorful story of the "Palace Theatre"
14. See discussion infra notes 16-84 and accompanying text.
15. See discussion infra notes 209-63 and accompanying text.
16. McGhan v. Ebersol, 608 F. Supp. 277, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
17. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930); Dymow v.
Bolton, II F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926); Fendler v. Morosco, 171 N.E. 56 (N.Y. 1930).
It must be acknowledged-as the defendants point out-that nearly a century ago
our court stated that common-law copyright extended to "[e]very [sic] new and
innocent product of mental labor which has been embodied in writing, or some other
material form." Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532, 537 [(N.Y. 1872)] (emphasis
supplied). And, more recently, it has been said that 'an author has no property right
in his ideas unless ... given embodiment in a tangible form.' O'Brien v. RKO Radio
Pictures, D.C. [sic], 68 F.Supp. [sic] 13, 14 [(S.D.N.Y. 1946)]. However, as a
noted scholar in the field has observed, "the underlying rationale for common law
copyright (i.e., the recognition that a property status should attach to the fruits of
intellectual labor) is applicable regardless of whether such labor assumes tangible
form" (Nimmer, Copyright, § 11.1, p. 40) [sic]. The principle that it is not the
tangible embodiment of the author's work but the creation of the work itself which
is protected finds recognition in a number of ways in copyright law.
Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 254 (N.Y. 1968).
18. O'Brien v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 13, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
19. Id.
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and old vaudeville characters, was not considered sufficiently concrete to satisfy the standard.20 The court held that the story of the
theater itself was too abstract and too general to give rise to a claim
of literary property, even if'it was copied by a film producer. 2' The
lack of concreteness was evidenced by the plaintiffs own statement
within his initial proposal, which stated that "[the] real story of the
Palace Theatre would stem naturally from the material that thorough and painstaking research would uncover. '"22
The second legal obstacle that an idea creator must overcome to
obtain protection is the novelty requirement. In Murray v. National
BroadcastingCompany, the court held that the lack of novelty in an
idea precluded a plaintiff from having the court enjoin its unauthorized use.2 3
An examination of New York case law reveals that there are
several definitions of novelty, instead of just one. For example, it has
been held that an idea is not novel if it is a matter of common
knowledge or if it is simply an adaptation of existing knowledge.24 It
has also been stated that if an idea exists in the public domain, it is
not novel.25 An idea will not meet the novelty standard if it is in the
industry at the time of the creator's submission, 21 or ifitismerely
an improvement of a standard technique or quality, a judicious use
of existing means, or a mixture of known ingredients in somewhat
different proportions. 27
20. Id. at 14.
21. Id.; Compare Stone v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 N.Y.S.2d 210 (App. Div.
1940) (where an advertising idea reduced to a script was found not to be a concrete form, and,
thus, was not afforded protection) and Carneval v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 124
N.Y.S.2d 319, 320 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 137 N.Y.S.2d 612 (App. Div. 1954) (where the
court held that the plaintiff could not successfully prosecute a case unless he proved "independent creation of a new, novel, unique idea or a combination of ideas reduced to a concrete
form").
22. O'Brien, 68 F. Supp. at 14.
23. 671 F. Supp. at 236.
24. McGhan, 608 F. Supp. at 286.
25. Granoff v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 775 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); see Ed
Graham Prods., Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 347 N.Y.S.2d 766, 769 (Sup. Ct. 1973)
(holding that "the idea for larger-than-life heroes with juvenile helpers fighting evildoers and
embarking on all sorts of fantastic adventures" lacks novelty, is in the public domain, and
may, therefore, be used with impunity without incurring liability for misappropriation).
26. Ed Graham Prods., 347 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
27. Eenkhoorn v. New York Tel. Co., 568 N.Y.S.2d 677 (App. Div. 1990) (citing Educational Sales Programs, Inc. v. Dreyfus Corp., 317 N.Y.S.2d 840, 843-44 (Sup. Ct. 1970));
see Ring v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, 874 F.2d 109 (2d Cir.
1989) (an idea is not novel if it is merely a variation on a basic theme); see also Koret, Inc.,
v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 412, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that an idea is not
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One commentator has suggested that the courts' denial of recovery for idea misappropriation is due to an accumulation of factors,
which include the "inherent difficulty of enforcing rights in ideas, the
desire to protect buyers of ideas from harassing litigation, the public
policy against the encouragement of monopoly of ideas, and the difficulty of measuring the value of such intangibles.
-"8 New York
courts rationalize the necessity for the stringent standards as a
method to find novelty in an idea; consequently, they order compen29
sation based upon that "novelty or uniqueness.
A case which illustrates how this standard is applied is Ed Graham Productions, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co.3 In Graham,
the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment in
an action for misappropriation of an idea for a cartoon series because the court found that the plaintiff's idea was not sufficiently
novel. 31 The plaintiff, a firm in the business of developing and producing television programming material, claimed that it had come
up with an idea for an animated children's television series entitled
"Birdman and Sparrow. '32 Sample scripts and drawings of the characters in the proposed series were submitted to the vice-president for
daytime programming at NBC, but NBC rejected the plaintiff's
idea. 33 Instead, the network adopted a different agency's proposal
also entitled "Birdman." 3 " The court found that the plaintiff's "Birdman" was entirely dissimilar from the defendant's "Birdman": one
novel if it has been suggested or known by the public at a prior time).
28. Edward M. Swartz, The Protection of Intangible Interests, 49 MAss. L.Q 107, 121
(1964).
29. Educational Sales Programs, Inc. v. Dreyfus Corp., 317 N.Y.S.2d 840, 843-44 (Sup.
Ct. 1970). Unless it is novel, an idea does not merit protection. Id. at 844. An idea which is
merely a sensible suggestion may not necessarily be legally protected as an idea. Id. at 843.
Courts following this rationale recognize that an idea might be the subject of general knowledge. See, e.g., id. at 843. Unless the idea's creator can show that the idea is novel, the creator
has not thought of anything new and, therefore, has no property right to protect. See, e.g.,
Ring v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), afid, 874 F.2d 109 (2d Cir.
1989) (holding that plaintiff's intellectual property claims were completely precluded under
New York law where they arose out of a third party's public use of the idea of videotaping a
"makeover" session at which a cosmetician instructed a customer about the appropriate application of cosmetics and giving a copy to the customer); Soule v. Bon Ami Co., 195 N.Y.S. 574
(App. Div. 1922), affd, 139 N.E. 754 (N.Y. 1923) (advice to raise prices in order to increase
profits was not advice worthy of compensation).
30. 347 N.Y.S.2d 766 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
31. Id. at 770.
32. Id. at 767.
33. Id. at 768.
34. Id.
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had "super" powers, while the other did not.35 Based upon these distinctions, the court held that no evidence existed that the defendant
had misappropriated the plaintiff's idea." Furthermore, the court
found that the plaintiff's idea lacked novelty, stating that the idea of
"larger-than-life heroes with juvenile helpers fighting evil-doers" was
not an original concept.3 7
B.

The Ineffective Standardsfor Measuring Idea Protection

Despite the policy justifications in support of using the novelty
and concreteness standards, such standards are ineffective in determining whether an idea deserves protection. Rather than achieving
equitable results, these standards, instead, serve as complete barriers
affording no protection to the creators of ideas.3 8 It has been argued
that by utilizing novelty and concreteness as substantive elements,
courts are unnecessarily distracted from the ultimate question of
whether a defendant actually used a plaintiff's idea.39 As a result,
courts use "a shotgun approach to eliminate meritless claims [which]
needlessly forecloses meritorious claims as well."' 0 Furthermore,
there is a suspicion that courts manipulate the law to sidestep juries
by giving substantial weight to such amorphous elements."1 Proof of
actual use should be sufficient to support a claim of misappropriation, and evidence of such use is what courts should really scrutinize.
1. The Inherent Vagueness of the Concreteness Standard
The standard of concreteness that must be proved in order for a
court to afford legal protection to an idea is problematic and few
cases have fashioned a practical definition of the term. 2 Some courts
have attempted to define it in the negative, and illustrate what is not
concrete; however, there has been little guidance regarding the correct use of the standard.4" It has been stated that "[tihe critical elements of concreteness are matters dependent largely upon the 'eye of
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 769.
38. Swarth, supra note 1, at 122.
39. See Joseph E. Kovacs, Note, Beyond the Realm of Copyright: Is There Legal Sanctuary for the Merchant of Ideas?, 41 BROOK. L. REV. 284 (1974); see also Harold C. Havighurst, The Right to Compensation for an Idea, 49 Nw. U. L. REV. 295 (1954).
40. Kovacs, supra note 39, at 323.
41. See Havighurst, supra note 39, at 303, 305; see also Kovacs, supra note 39, at 323.
42. Swarth, supra note 1, at 122.
43. Id.
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the beholding' court.""" It can be concluded from this statement that
the arbitrary distinction between abstract and concrete only serves to
facilitate the ad hoc decision of a court of whether or not "this plot,
this theme, or these characters should . . be granted the sanctuary
of the copyright laws.""
New York courts also have different ideas about what the standard of concreteness is intended to measure. These varying conceptions range anywhere from a general conceptualization to the full
definition of the idea,4 increasing the inherent vagueness about what
must be proved to satisfy this standard.4 7 Where courts have not indicated which of the definitions apply, concreteness is usually shown
via a written expression of the idea in question;48 however, even this
apparent commonality has produced inconsistent results. For example, in Healey v. R.H. Macy & Co., R.H. Macy & Co. (Macy's),
the defendant, used the plaintiff's Christmas advertising slogan, "A
Macy Christmas Means a Happy New Year." 50 The plaintiff alleged
that Macy's previously agreed to pay a stated sum if it used the
plaintiff's idea, but Macy's refused to compensate the plaintiff.5 1 The
plaintiff successfully sued on a theory of implied contract to recover
the value of the advertising slogans and ideas submitted to the defendant. 52 Thus, the slogans were deemed sufficiently concrete to be
44.

Miller, supra note 5, at 1019 n.65 (quoting Joseph E. Kovacs, supra note 39, at 289,

296).
45. Robert Y. Libott, Round the Prickly Pear: The Idea-Expression Fallacy in a Mass
Communications World, 14 UCLA L. REV. 735, 740 (1967) (emphasis in original).
46. Id.; see, e.g., Stone v. Marcus Loew Booking Agency, 63 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct.
1946) (in order to be protected, an idea must take a physical form at the time of disclosure).
47. Swarth, supra note 1,at 123.
48. See Stone v. Marcus Loew Booking Agency, 63 N.Y.S.2d at 222 (stating that "an
idea which never takes a concrete form at the time of disclosure, even if novel, is not the
subject of a property right or of a contract"); Carneval v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 124
N.Y.S.2d 319, 320 (Sup. Ct. 1953, affid, 137 N.Y.S.2d 612 (App. Div. 1954) (where the trial
court held that the plaintiff could not successfully prosecute a case for quasi-contractual relief,
unless he proved "independent creation of a new, novel, or unique idea or a combination of
ideas reduced to concrete form"). In NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, the authors criticize this use of
a writing as a touchstone for concreteness because an abstract idea may be put on paper (for
example, the idea in O'Brien, while in the written form, was very abstract) and a highlydeveloped and detailed idea may be presented orally. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 16.08[A], at 16-53 (1990).
49. 297 N.Y.S. 165 (App. Div. 1937), affd, 14 N.E.2d 388 (N.Y. 1938).
50. Bailey v. Haberle Congress Brewing Co., 85 N.Y.S.2d 51, 53 (Syracuse Mun. Ct.
1948) (discussing Healey v. R.H. Macy & Co., 297 N.Y.S. 165 (App. Div. 1937)).
51. Healey v. R.H. Macy & Co., 14 N.E.2d 388 (N.Y. 1938).
52. Id.
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considered literary property. 53
Yet in a later case, Bailey v. Haberle Congress Brewing CO.,"
whose facts were similar to those in Healey, the court denied the
plaintiff's implied contract claim. 55 In Bailey, the plaintiff claimed
that the defendant improperly used the slogan "Neighborly Haberle"-a phrase which the plaintiff had created, and which was
communicated to the defendant by the plaintiff at an earlier date. 6
The court distinguished the case from Healey by pointing out that,
in Healey, the "plaintiff submitted to the defendant not merely a
slogan, but a full and complete advertising campaign plan in writing,
featuring the slogan, with drawings and sketches, and 200 words of
carefully phrased advertising material. 15 7 It is difficult to discern
whether the "Bailey court viewed the writing submitted in Healey as
simply a tangible expression of the plaintiff's idea, or as a fully developed concept." 58 Regardless of how the Bailey court viewed the
writing, the two cases appear irreconcilable because both defendants
only used the slogan, and never utilized any of the additional
submissions. 59
Moreover, if a court looks at the level of conceptual development as a means of measuring concreteness, instead of judging the
concreteness by the physical tangibility of the idea, problems arise in
discerning how the court determines the particular level of conceptual development. 6" Two lines of analysis have been used to identify
the point at which an idea is concrete. The first is that an idea is
concrete only when it has been developed and is "ready for immediate use without any additional embellishment." 6 1 Under this analysis, at least one authority on copyright law suggests that the slogans
in Healey and Bailey were both concrete. 62
The question under the second analysis is whether the defendant
could have produced the end product if the plaintiff did not produce
the elaborated idea in the first place. 63 "If the answer is no, then the
53. See id.
54. 85 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Syracuse Mun. Ct. 1948).
55. Id. at 52.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 53.
58. Swarth, supra note 1, at 123.
59. See NIMMER, supra note 48, § 16.08[A], at 16-55.
60. Id. § 16.08[A], at 16-52.
61. Id. ("to speak of an idea developed to the point where it is ready for use presents a
contradiction in terms since if an idea is so developed it ceases to be merely an idea").
62. Id. § 16.08[A], at 16-55.
63. Deborah A. Levine, Case Note, The Cosby Show: Just Another Sitcom?, 9 Loy.
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plaintiff has a right in the elaborated idea and is entitled to protection."'6 4 Ultimately, the commentators argue that the courts which
adhere to the doctrine that protects only concrete ideas do not really
protect ideas to any significant degree.6 5
2.

The Inability to Satisfy the Novelty Standard

The novelty requirement imposes an insurmountable burden on
the creator before his idea will be protected as a property right. 6 In
reference to Murray, Swarth stated:
The New York approach creates a separate, lower status for idea
vendors, as opposed to purveyors of any other type of product....
"Novelty" is not an implied requirement in a contract for any other
type of service or product. For example, when NBC asks one of its
suppliers to show pencils for sale, and uses one of them, it cannot
deny the contract to pay for its use on the ground that a pencil can
be gotten anywhere. However, NBC asked Murray to show his
product, and then, having used it, [footnote omitted] sought to
deny responsibility to pay for it on the basis that-this product could
be gotten elsewhere. 7
Rather than identifying the creator, this standard requires an idea to
be unique; a standard which is virtually impossible to achieve." Absolute novelty is indeed a rarity, especially in literature.6 9 This is
particularly true in dramatic literature, where it has been said that
there are only thirty-six possible dramatic plots. 7 0 Consequently, the
novelty standard has been universally criticized by commentators exploring the law of ideas. 71 "[W]here a court addresses itself to novENT. L.J. 137, 146 (1989) (citing Rubenstein, Copyright Protection for "Elaborated Ideas",
LAw TIMES, Dec. 6, 1957, at 296, col. I).

64. Id.
65. NIMMER, supra note 48, § 16.08[A], at 16-53.
66. Id. at 16-58 to 16-66; see also Richard J. Greenstone, "It's Not Sufficiently Novel,"
Held the Judge, ENT. & SPORTS L., Fall 1987, at 5, 6.
The novelty requirement imposes a nearly impossible standard for the protection of
an idea-that it be new or not formerly known to anyone. Our society thrives on the
use of that which has come before to achieve advances in the arts, literature, science
and technology. Especially in literature, very little material is truly novel. The novelty standard has been universally criticized by commentators exploring the law of
ideas....
Id.
67. Swarth, supra note 1, at 127.
68. See Greenstone, supra note 66, at 6.
69. Id.
70. Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 271 (Cal. 1956) (en banc).
71. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 5, at 1018-19; see also Kovacs, supra note 39, at 294-
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elty, as a matter of law or fact, it may be presumed
to be looking for
72
the means by which to dismiss the complaint.
III.

MURRAY

A.

V. NATIONAL

BROADCASTING CO.

The Procedural History

In September, 1985, Hwesu S. Murray commenced suit against
NBC and Brandon Tartikoff on charges of misappropriation. 7 He
sought damages and declaratory and injunctive relief as the "sole
owner of all the rights in, and the idea, proposal and property
[known as] 'Father's Day.' ",74 His complaint asserted various causes
of action arising out of the defendants' alleged misappropriation of
his idea including, but not limited to, misappropriation and unjust
enrichment.7 5 He claimed that he would prove that what had become
the enormously successful and lucrative Cosby Show was his idea,
76
and that NBC had stolen it.
Both parties stipulated that New York law governed the action; 77 thus, a finding of concreteness and novelty was required by
the trial court in order for the plaintiff to be successful.7 8 The defendants made a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
Murray's idea was neither "novel" nor "concrete," and that, under
New York law, Murray could not obtain recovery for an idea which
lacked those characteristics. 7 9 Judge Cedarbaum, writing for the majority in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, granted the defendants' motion, holding that Murray's
idea was not sufficiently novel to create a property interest.80 Naturally, Murray appealed.8 1
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit upheld the lower court's decision. 2 Murray petitioned the
Supreme Court to consider whether he had been deprived of due
96.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Kovacs, supra note 39, at 296.
See Murray, 671 F. Supp. at 239.
See id.
Id. at 238-39.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 239.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 245.
See Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., 844 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1988).
Id. at 995.
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process; however, certiorari was denied.8 3
B.

The Facts

In 1979, NBC hired Murray as a unit manager in its sports
division.84 In 1980, Murray contacted an NBC official, William
Dannhauser, about some ideas-which he developed while outside
the scope of his employment with NBC-for future television programs.85 Dannhauser told him to submit his proposals in writing,
and, soon thereafter, Murray submitted five written proposals-one
of which was entitled "Father's Day."'8' He informed NBC that if it
was interested in any of the proposals, he expected to be named executive producer and to receive appropriate credit and compensation
87
as the creator of the program.
Dannhauser encouraged Murray to "flesh out" his proposal and
submit it to Josh Kane, then an NBC vice-president and top official
with NBC Entertainment-the division of NBC responsible for network television programming. 8 In accordance with Dannhauser's directive, Murray submitted an expanded proposal for "Father's Day"
to Kane.8 9
"The expansion of 'Father's Day' took Murray several months
to accomplish and included preparation of notes, drafts, program elements, a biography of the father in the show and extensive research." 9 After this extensive research, Murray concluded that Bill
Cosby would be the best choice for the lead role in "Father's Day."9
Murray also suggested roles for a working spouse and five children.92
He indicated that the proposed series would "combine humor with
serious situations in a manner similar to the old Dick Van Dyke
Show" but "with a Black perspective. " 93 Murray's expanded propo83. Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., 488 U.S. 955 (1988).
84. Murray, 671 F. Supp. at 237.
85. Id. at 238.
86. Id. at 237. He described his program, in part, as follows: "The father will not be a
buffoon, a supermasculine menial or a phantom. Children will not engage in eye-rolling 'sassiness' or abusive anti-social behavior. The mother will be neither a heavy-set cleaning woman,
nor a struggling person without purpose or direction." Id. at 240.
87. Id. at 238.
88. Murray, 844 F.2d at 990.
89. Id.
90. Brief for Appellant at 20, Murray v. National BroadcastingCo., 844 F.2d 988 (2d
Cir. 1988) (No. 87-7695) [hereinafter Brief].
91. Id.
92. Murray, 844 F.2d at 990.
93. Id.
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sal concluded with the observation that "[l]ike Roots, the show will
attempt to depict life in a [closely-knit] Black family, with the addition of a contemporary, urban setting." 94
On November 21, 1980, Kane returned the "Father's Day" submission to Murray and informed him that "we are not interested in
pursuing [its] development at this time."9 5 Specifically, Kane told
Murray that his superiors had decided that NBC would not acquire
Murray's rights in "Father's Day." '
Four years later, in the fall of 1984, The Cosby Show premiered
on NBC.9 The Cosby Show was a half-hour weekly situation comedy series about everyday life in an upper middle-class black family
in New York City. 9" Furthermore, the lead role was played by Bill
Cosby." In its first season, The Cosby Show soared to the top of the
Nielsen ratings and became one of the most popular programs in
television history.1"' Subsequent to the broadcast of The Cosby
Show, NBC moved from last place to first place in the network television ratings.1" 1 The entire industry attributed the dramatic rise to
the phenomenal success of The Cosby Show. Industry watchers said
that the show's popularity was caused by its refreshing premise that
black families could be discovered living in middle-class America. 102
Brandon Tartikoff, the president of NBC Entertainment, Bill
Cosby, and Carsey-Werner, the production company, were credited
with the creation and development of The Cosby Show.10 3 However,
Carsey-Werner never submitted any written treatment, story, literary property, program idea, format or concept to NBC for The
Cosby Show. 04 -Furthermore, Tartikoff was a supervisor of
Kane-the man who, four years earlier, rejected Murray's expanded
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. In 1980, NBC was in last place among the three major television networks and
had been unable to obtain and develop successful entertainment programs. Brief, supra note
90, at 18. Additionally, at that time, Bill Cosby was not involved with any regularly scheduled
show in prime-time television. Id.
101. Id. at 19.
102. Id. at 18. Cosby, Tartikoff, an adoring press, and NBC's contract with the producers all stated that the show was a "unique intellectual property." Joe Winski, Hwesu v. Huxtable, ADVERTISING AGE, October 3, 1988, at 44.
103. Murray, 844 F.2d at 990-91.
104. Brief, supra note 90, at 24.
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proposal for "Father's Day."105
In September, 1984, Murray and his wife watched the premiere
of The Cosby Show. 0 Despite the change in the name from "Father's Day" to The Cosby Show and a few other minor variations on
his idea, Murray knew The Cosby Show was directly derived from
his proposal which had been rejected by NBC four years earlier. °7
Immediately after viewing the premiere, Murray wrote a series
of letters to NBC claiming that The Cosby Show derived from his
idea for "Father's Day." ' 8 NBC denied the claim and stated that
"Father's Day" had "absolutely no role [in] the genesis" of The
Cosby Show, which was "developed and produced independently" by
Carsey-Werner. 0 9 Murray, through counsel, responded to NBC by
stating that he believed the defendants had used his property, "Father's Day," and, thus, violated his rights.' 10 Moreover, NBC never
suggested that Murray did not have rights in "Father's Day" and, in
fact, confirmed the existence of those rights."'
C.

The Majority's Incorrect Analysis

The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York granted NBC's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Murray's idea was not "sufficiently novel."" ' 2 The court
analogized "Father's Day" to such well-known television series as
Father Knows Best and The Dick Van Dyke Show," 3 and held that
Murray's proposal for a family situation comedy with black actors
was merely a simple variation of an often-used theme-a family sit4
uation comedy with a white family."1
105. Murray, 844 F.2d at 991.
106. Winski, supra note 102, at 44. Murray recalled that -[i]t was like an immediate
kick in the stomach. My wife and I just sat there in stone silence. We couldn't believe what we
were seeing." Id.
107. Id.
108. Murray, 844 F.2d at 990.
109. Brief, supra note 90, at 21. Murray wrote on November 7, 1984 that The Cosby
Show used "the basic concept, with no essential change" and after another denial by NBC,
Murray wrote "it is clear to me that my proposal is being used by NBC." Id.
110. Id.; see Murray. 844 F.2d at 991.
111. Brief, supra note 90, at 21; see infra notes 123-33 and accompanying text, arguing
that the contract between NBC and Carsey-Werner described the underlying idea as property
and also called the idea property.
112. Murray, 671 F. Supp. at 246.
113. Id. at 241.
114. Id.Thus, the court viewed The Cosby Show as simply an extension of Cosby's
humor and style. Id. at 241-43.
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The Dissent of the Second Circuit

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the Murray decision was upheld by a two-thirds majority. 116
Justice Pratt, disagreeing with both the lower court and the majority
in the Second Circuit, stated that the standard for determining the
novelty of Murray's idea is that "where plaintiff's idea is wholly
lacking in novelty, no cause of action in contract or tort can stand
based upon the alleged misappropriation of that idea." 11 6 However,
Justice Pratt argued, the majority defined the sole issue in the case
as "whether the idea ... was sufficiently novel to support a claim for
its unlawful use."" 1 Thus, implicit in the majority's holding was the
acknowledgment that some novelty existed in Murray's idea.1 1 8
Therefore, Justice Pratt concluded that, if the majority applied the
correct standard-"wholly lacking in novelty"-its decision was erroneous, because, under that standard, Murray's idea, as conceded
by the court, was not entirely lacking in novelty.1 1 9
Moreover, Justice Pratt argued that the court summarily dismissed facts crucial to Murray's case.1 20 While conceding that there
was evidence that Murray's idea was not novel, Justice Pratt argued
that there was also evidence which raised a genuine issue of material
fact which should have been decided by a jury. 21 The dissent relied
heavily upon the agreement between NBC and the producers, Carsey and Werner. 2 2 In that agreement, NBC referred to the series as
"unique, intellectual property, 1 2 3 supporting the opinion that NBC
perceived the idea to be novel and to have value.1 24 NBC argued,
and the majority agreed, that this clause referred to a "fully-produced television series," 12 5 and not Murray's program idea; however,
such analysis ignored two important points, according to Justice
Pratt. Initially, the "unique, intellectual property" language was
115.
116.
N.Y.S.2d
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Murray, 844 F.2d. at 990.
Id. at 991 (quoting Ed Graham Prods. Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 347
766 (Sup. Ct.1973)) (emphasis added).
Id. at 991 (emphasis added).
Id. at 996.
Id. at 997.
Id. at 996.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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found in the remedies section of the development agreement.12 6 This
section gave NBC the right to prevent the loss of its "unique, intellectual property" in the event Carsey-Werner failed to perform. 27
Thus, if Carsey-Werner failed to develop the television series, the
only "unique, intellectual property" that would have been protected
was the series' underlying idea. 2 ' At a minimum, according to Justice Pratt, the Carsey-Werner agreement constituted admissible evidence that Murray's idea was unique, thus, making the determina29
tion of novelty a question of fact.
Justice Pratt also stated that the majority ignored the definition
section of the development agreement which specifically defined
"property" to be the "story, literary property, program idea, and/or
program format which form(s) the basis" for the television series."'
This provision provided additional evidence that what NBC sought
to protect as a unique and novel property was Murray's underlying
idea and not the developed elements of the series as a whole. 3
Finally, Justice Pratt stated that NBC admitted that Murray
had "rights" in "Father's Day.' ' 3 2 NBC also admitted that the reason why rejected proposals were usually returned was because the
material "belonged" to the submitter.1 33 Thus, NBC implicitly recognized that the material belonged to Murray.
E.

The Injustice to Murray: The Grant of Summary Judgment

Murray was denied his day in court, despite the concession by
Judge Cedarbaum that the court assumed that NBC had, in fact,
used his idea without providing him with any compensation."3 Unfortunately, the court held that assumption to be inconsequential,
unless Murray's idea was found to be novel. 135
Not only should a jury have determined the originality of Murray's idea, but a jury also should have been allowed to address the
alleged independent origin of The Cosby Show. The court recognized
that NBC used the idea, therefore, the defendants' lack of truth in
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
Murray, 844 F.2d at 996 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 996-97.
Murray, 671 F. Supp. at 239.
Id. at 239-40.
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their claims could have been used to shed light on other issues before
the court. Based on the compilation of evidence, reasonable people
could have easily differed on whether or not Murray's idea was novel
and, thus, misappropriated by NBC. Furthermore, the novelty issue,
as a factual question, should have been subject to further discovery.
1. Murray's Idea Was Concrete
Despite the faulty standards, it is arguable that Murray, nevertheless, satisfied both the concreteness and novelty standards.13
Under the concreteness requirement, the courts sometimes require
only a written expression of the idea in question. Using this guideline, Murray's two-page proposal clearly embodied the requisite
physical and tangible concreteness.
If the slogan in Healey was considered to be concrete, literary
property worthy of legal protection, it is inconceivable that Murray's
submission to NBC was inadequate. 137 Consequently, it should have
been afforded the same protection. At the very least, the expanded
proposal that Murray submitted met the Healey test.13 8 Thus, a possible explanation for the Murray case is the inherent difficulty in
using a standard that comes without set guidelines or a clear definition to enable uniform application.
If the concreteness standard is employed, the previously discussed "elaborated idea" analysis is more appropriate for cases
where the plaintiff divulged an idea which was later exploited by the
defendant. 3 9 Under such a test, Murray's idea would have satisfied
136. See discussion supra notes 42-72 and accompanying text (regarding the novelty
and concreteness standards).
137. See discussion supra notes 49-59 (concerning the problems with the concreteness
standard as illustrated in the comparison of Healey and Bailey). Not only did Murray present
an oral presentation describing his proposal, but he also submitted the original proposal to
Kane; months later, after a great deal of research and hard work, he submitted the revised
proposal which was an intricate, lengthy and detailed version of the prior submission. Murray,
844 F.2d at 990. The lengthy, written memoranda were as concrete, if not more concrete, than
the slogan in Healey.
138. In Healey, the plaintiff was successful because he submitted a full and complete
advertising plan in writing, not merely a slogan. See supra notes 49-53, 57 and accompanying
text. Contra Bailey v. Haberle Congress Brewing Co., 85 N.Y.S.2d 51 (Syracuse Mun. Ct.
1948) (holding that a mere slogan is not afforded protection). The latter case can be distinguished from the Murray case because Murray did not submit a mere skeletal structure or
idea, but a two-page detailed proposal of the situation comedy, the story, the characters, and
the like. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text. Even if the first proposal of Father's
Day is analogous to the slogan in Bailey, the revision is analogous to the written plan in
Healey.
139. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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the standard for concreteness.
For example, in Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enterprises, Ltd.,410
a case similar to Murray, the plaintiff proposed a program entitled
"The Coward" to the defendants.' 4' The idea behind the program
was that a person whose courage had been challenged would purposely place himself in situations which repeatedly tested his courage.1 4 At the defendants' request, the plaintiff submitted his written
presentation and, later, a script for the initial episode of the proposed
14 3
series.
Five years thereafter, the defendants aired a show called
Branded which had the same basic theme as that proposed by the
plaintiff."" The Fink court stated that the plaintiff's presentation
was a "partial (but substantial) development of a fully worked out
sub-theme toward a completely expressed television series, well calculated to give a clear insight to what the finished article would be
like."'1 4 5 Furthermore, the court held that it was "not likely that
[the ] defendants would have produced their end product if [the]
plaintiff had not authored and supplied his elaborated idea."' 4 The
court also noted that a large part of the plaintiff's presentation was
the plan for an entire series including full background story, the
molding of the hero's character and personality, the method for
1 7
flashing back on the story, and various portrayal techniques.
Like Fink, Murray submitted more than just an idea. His proposal was a substantial development toward a complete television
show with a clear insight to the finished article. As in Fink, Murray
submitted an expanded proposal for "Father's Day" at NBC's request. 4 Murray made casting suggestions, presented numerous,
very specific ideas for the characters and storylines, and proposed
that the show be a combination of humor and serious situations. 4 9
The Cosby Show embodied virtually all of the elements that were
contained in Murray's expanded proposal. 50 The similarities be140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (Ct. App. 1970).
Id. at 683.
Id.
Id. at 684-85.
Id. at 685.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 693.
Id.
Murray, 844 F.2d at 990.
Id.
Id.
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tween Murray's proposal and The Cosby Show would lead a reasonable person to believe that NBC would not have produced the show
without Murray's proposal.15 1 Although the elaborated idea standard
was not applied, if it was, Murray's idea would have been entitled to

protection.
2.

1 52

Murray's Idea Was Novel

Murray satisfied the novelty standard. Cosby and Tartikoff
stated that they believed that The Cosby Show was novel and
unique.' 53 Assuming, as the court did, that The Cosby Show was
merely a derivation of "Father's Day," Tartikoff admitted to the
novelty of "Father's Day."' 54 Moreover, an affidavit presented at
trial from Mr. J. Fred MacDonald, a history professor at Northeastern Illinois University in Chicago, firmly established the existence of
novelty in "Father's Day."' 55
Additionally, the court erroneously relied upon Downey v. General Foods Corp.'58 in granting the motion. In Downey, the New
York Court of Appeals established the general proposition that
"[l]ack of novelty in an idea is fatal to any cause of action for its
unlawful use."' 57 The plaintiff in Downey wrote to the defendant,
stating that he had an "excellent idea to increase the sale of [the
defendant's] product JELL-O . . . making it available for children.' 58 "Several days later, the defendant sent the plaintiff an
151. Levine, supra note 63, at 137.
152. Murray, 844 F.2d at 996-97.
153. Murray, 671 F. Supp. at 240.
154. See id. ("Tartikoff described The Cosby Show as adding a new and unique dimension to the American television family genre.").
155. Brief, supra note 90, at 13. Professor McDonald stated:
[Tielevision has never before had a show like "The Cosby Show." That show
presents a Black American nuclear family, where the family is whole and where
both parents are professionals who work at their professions. The father is the predominant figure. The children all interact with their parents obediently and respectfully. This is not a Black situation comedy, but it is a realistic comedy. To the
extent Black families have been shown in the past, they were almost always poor
and/or split, without any dominant father figure. None of these shows portrayed a
Black family as does "The Cosby Show." That portrayal has never before been seen
on television.
Id.
156. 286 N.E.2d 257 (N.Y. 1972).
157. Id. at 259 (quoting Brain v. Dannon Milk Prods., Inc., 307 N.Y.S.2d 571 (App.
Div. 1970) (where the idea submitted by the plaintiff to the defendants-depicting an infant in
a high-chair eating yogurt-was lacking in novelty and had been utilized by the defendants
and their competitors prior to its submission)).
158. Id.
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'Idea Submittal Form' . . . which included a form letter and a space
for explaining the idea. ' 159 The plaintiff returned it with a suggestion that the product "'be packaged and distributed to children
under the name 'WIG-L-E' (meaning wiggly or wiggley) or 'WIGGLE-E' or 'WIGGLE-EEE' or 'WIGLEY." '"6 He explained that
his own children wished to eat JELL-O more often under the suggested names than by the actual name, JELL-O.'
This was the
only recorded proof of the plaintiff's idea." 2 In response, the defendant wrote a letter to the plaintiff, indicating that it had no interest in
his idea or its promotion.' 63 Later that year, however, the defendant
introduced a JELL-O product into the market called "Mr. Wiggle."' 6 4 The plaintiff brought suit, and the defendant answered, stating that it independently created the name before plaintiff's initial
submission. 6 5 Court findings indicated a clear lack of novelty;
among other things, the defendant had made use of the word "wiggles" in advertisements that appeared prior to plaintiff's
submission.16
The facts of Downey, however, are clearly distinguishable from
those of Murray. In contrast to Downey, the defendant in Murray
expressed an interest in the idea and encouraged the plaintiff to
"flesh it out."'6 7 After months of work caused by NBC's interest in
his idea, Murray submitted an expanded proposal. 6 8 Furthermore,
in Murray, the defendant made numerous arguments regarding the
genesis of The Cosby Show which, after investigation, appeared to
be suspect. 6 9 In this respect, Murray mirrors the situation in Hea159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 259. A television commercial prepared in 1959 contained the phrase "all that
wiggles is not Jell-O," and a 1960 newspaper advertisement depicted Indian puppets and the
words "make a wigglewam of Jell-O for your tribe tonight." Id.
167. Murray, 844 F.2d at 990.
168. Id. It set forth every detail of the proposed situation comedy including the characters, specific actors to play such roles, the plot, the number of children and the location. See
supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
169. Although the defendants claimed that Tartikoff and Carsey-Werner independently
created The Cosby Show, Murray, 844 F.2d at 991; Brief, supra note 90, at 19, "it [wa]s
uncontested that the idea for Bill Cosby to do a show about a Black, middle-class family which
led to 'The Cosby Show' came from NBC, and not from Cosby, Carsey, or Werner." Id. at 1719. NBC also stated that The Cosby Show originated from a proposal from the William Mor-
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ley, where the court found for the plaintiff because of inconsistencies
170
in the defendant's testimony.
Some courts in New York have indicated that if the novelty
requirement must be maintained, its severity should be mitigated by
requiring the idea to be novel only to the defendant; the defendant
must first learn of the idea through the plaintiff's disclosure. 171 The
theory is that, even if an idea is not novel to the world because
others may have the same idea, it is novel if the defendant has never
heard of it.' 72 Under this standard, if the defendant first learns of
the idea from the plaintiff, even if the idea was not originated by the
plaintiff, the idea is sufficiently novel to the defendant and the plaintiff should be allowed to recover." 3
In Murray, it was suggested that one of the reasons that novelty
did not exist was because of a 1965 interview in which Bill Cosby
expressed an interest in the type of series Murray had later proposed.' 74 However, NBC failed to present evidence demonstrating
that it was aware of the interview or that Cosby had such an interest. 7 ' Under New York's theory, because NBC was apparently unaware of Cosby's intentions, the interview should not have any bearing on the court's determination of whether or not the idea was novel
76
to NBC.'
While the elements of an idea may not be novel, courts have
held that a combination of ideas is novel. 1 77 In Stanley v. Columbia
Broadcasting Systems, Inc.,' 78 the court concluded that the plaintiff
had a right to protection for his radio program idea. 7 9 In Stanley,
the plaintiff had submitted a recording of a radio program similar to
the one later broadcast by the defendant. 8 ' The plaintiff's program
ris Agency. Id. at 22. However, an official from the William Morris Agency testified that the
William Morris Agency had nothing to do with the creation of The Cosby Show. Id.
170. Healey, 297 N.Y.S. at 165.
171. See Greenstone, supra note 66, at 6; see, e.g., Berry v. Glidden Co., 92 F. Supp.
909 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 256 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1953); Soule v. Bon Ami
Co., 795 N.Y.S. 574, 575 (App. Div. 1922); Burwell v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 164 N.E. 434
(Ohio Ct. App. 1928).
172. NIMMER, supra note 48, § 16.08[B], at 16-62 to 16-63.
173. Id. § 16.08[B], at 16-63.
174. Murray, 671 F. Supp at 244.
175. Murray, 844 F.2d at 997.
176. See Levine, supra note 63, at 146.
177. Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 221 P.2d 73, 79 (Cal. 1950) (en
banc).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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format, entitled "Hollywood Preview," presented a story likely to become a movie.181 Listeners were asked to send their opinions of the
story and suggestions for casting to the broadcasting station, and the
best letters received cash prizes."8 2 The defendant's show was also
called Hollywood Preview and involved the performance of a radio
version of a story being made into a movie. 18 3 The theater audience
1 4
filled out cards giving their opinions and casting suggestions.
The Stanley court stated that "the question of originality of
[the] plaintiff's program is not one of law to be determined by the
court, but is one of fact for the jury's determination.'

8 5

The court

plaintiff,8 6

upheld the jury's verdict for the
stating that the selection, arrangement, and combination of old ideas into new ideas required skill, discretion, and creative effort. 87
Although the dissent in Stanley did not agree that the combination of the elements in plaintiff's proposal was novel, it did state that
"[a] new twist to a worn idea may be as much entitled to credit as
an entirely new idea.'

88

Furthermore, the dissent stated that "[a]

fresh application of the familiar, however dull or commonplace it
may appear to the critical, may be a marketable idea if it gives
enough promise of winning the attention of the public."'8 9 Thus,
even an idea lacking in creativity may still be marketable and have
value, if it wins the public's attention.
Murray satisfied the Stanley test because the combination of
the elements in his proposal was novel. Instead of a white family
situation comedy, Murray suggested using black actors in a family
situation comedy in non-stereotypical roles.' 90 Even the trial court
acknowledged that The Cosby Show was an industry breakthrough. 19' However, instead of finding novelty, the trial court concluded that this was merely the achievement of a fairer, more positive, and realistic portrayal of blacks; a need which many
Americans, including Bill Cosby, had recognized for many years. 92
181. Id. at 74-75.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 74.
184. Id. at 77.
185. Id. at 80.
186. Id. at 81-82.
187. Id. at 79.
188. Id. at 89.
189. Id. at 90.
190. Murray, 844 F.2d at 991-92.
191. Murray, 671 F. Supp. at 238.
192. Murray, 844 F.2d at 992.
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The court should have considered this as a new twist on an old
idea-the statement that it merely "won the public's attention" or
was a "marketable and valuable idea" was a gross understatement.
Due to the sufficient novelty of Murray's idea, the court should
not have overlooked, much less ratified, the violative behavior cast
against an unassuming Murray. The requirement of novelty should
never be blindly or automatically applied merely because the subject
matter of the litigation happens to be an idea.193 Other New York
courts applying the same standard acted cautiously, not blindly, albeit in a faulty manner.""
For example, in Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc.,' 95 the
defendant, Reader's Digest Association (RDA), had encouraged the
plaintiff to submit ideas for articles to the defendant for consideration during a ten year period. 96 The defendant developed one of the
plaintiff's ideas into a lead article for an issue of the defendant's
magazine,' 9 7 but failed to compensate the plaintiff for his idea.' 98
The Werlin court held that "to permit RDA to refuse to pay . . .
would be, notwithstanding the fact that RDA did not act in bad
faith, to permit an injustice of the most fundamental sort."' 99
The court's discussion of the unjust enrichment of RDA at the
expense of the plaintiff indicates that New York courts are not completely adverse to looking at factors other than novelty in deciding
whether an idea has been misappropriated. The court stated that "if
the civil law has any reason for its existence, it is to remedy situations such as this one." 20 0 The Murray court ignored Werlin and
other cases which were analogous to the instant case. Rather, the
Murray court relied on dissimilar cases in precluding recovery for
Murray.2 0 1 Moreover, because Murray's proposal, "Father's Day,"
193. NIMMER, supra note 48, § 16.08[B], at 16-65.
194. Id.
195. 528 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
196. Id. at 451.
197. Id. at 452.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Brief, supra note 90, at 37-38; see Cole v. Phillips H. Lord, Inc., 28 N.Y.S.2d 404,
406-07 (App. Div. 1941) (reversing the trial court's dismissal of a similar case involving a
proposal for a radio program due to lack of novelty). The Appellate Division did not even
discuss novelty, finding it sufficient that the jury "would have been justified in concluding that
as between these parties it was [the] plaintiff's original basic idea .... Id. (emphasis added).
But see, Ed Graham Prods., Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 347 N.Y.S.2d 766 (Sup. Ct.
1973) (where the court found that the defendant's program was independently created, not
similar to the plaintiff's proposal, and admitted to be derived from an existing character al-
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was a valuable idea, developed by substantial effort, and was misappropriated for the defendants' own profit to the disadvantage of
Murray, the defendants "cannot be heard to say that it is too fugitive or evanescent to be regarded as property."2 "2
Justice Pratt did not believe that New York defined "novelty"
so strictly;2 0 3 if it did, then the state would be discouraging the submission of ideas and would be threatening the free flow of ideas. 20 4 It
has been stated that "[tihe New York scheme offers only illusory
protection to the 'idea man,' removing any incentive for him to divulge his idea. ' 2 5 The inevitable result of this approach forces idea
creators to refrain from revealing their ideas to anyone for fear that
there will be no recourse when the ideas are stolen.2 0 6
Therefore, while a few disclosure cases state that novelty is a
requirement without which there is no claim, 20 7 the courts have actually focused on the specific conduct and the relationship of the parties. 20 8 Accordingly, the clear existence of novelty in Murray's idea
(which alone should have mandated denial of the motion) as well as
the facts related to the conduct of the defendant and Murray should
have been considered by the court.
V.

THEORIES TO CURTAIL THE MISAPPROPRIATION OF IDEAS

Other jurisdictions base their decisions in idea misappropriation
cases on principles of equity, rather than the subjective standards
that New York applies. The liberal approach to idea protection
adopted by California does not require the plaintiff idea creators to
ready known to the public as "Batman"); McGhan v. Ebersol, 608 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (The idea for "Friday Night Videos," a television series, was admittedly not the plaintiff's idea, but that of the defendants. Furthermore, the defendant's proposal was based on
"MTV" also known as "Music Television Video.").
202. Brief, supra note 90, at 41 (quoting International News Serv. v. Associated Press,
248 U.S. 215, 236, 240 (1918), where the Supreme Court held that when parties in the same
field seek to profit from the same subject matter, "[it] hardly can fail to recognize that for this
purpose, and as between them, it must be regarded as quasi-property, irrespective of the rights
of either as against the public."
203. Murray, 844 F.2d at 997.
204. See Swarth, supra note 1, at 118.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 121.
207. See supra text and cases accompanying notes 24-37.
208. Brief, supra note 90, at 35; see Vantage Point, Inc. v. Parker Bros., Inc., 529 F.
Supp. 1204, 1216 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affid, 697 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[W]hile the idea
disclosure cases generally refer to the idea in suit as the plaintiff's claimed 'property,' the
decisions have focused primarily on the relationship between the parties (or lack thereof) and
not on any a priori recognition of exclusivity in the idea.").
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prove novelty or concreteness, which results in a more favorable environment for idea creators. 0 9
If Murray had brought suit in California, it is likely that he
would have recovered damages because the California courts would
have focused on the confidential relationship of the parties, and the
fact that NBC took advantage of that relationship.' 10 Instead of imposing the strict standard of novelty, a California court would have
concentrated on the reliance Murray placed on the defendants when
he submitted his idea, and the fact that the parties did not deal at
arm's length throughout their relationship."
A California case illustrating this approach is Landsberg v.
Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc.,2" 2 which resulted in the
protection of the plaintiff's abstract idea.2 3 In that case, the plaintiff
wrote a book on strategies for winning the Scrabble board game.2" 4
He then contacted the defendant, the owner of the Scrabble trademark, and requested permission to use the trademark. 1 5 The defendant requested the manuscript, and the plaintiff provided it. 2" 6 After
negotiations between the parties broke down, the defendants published a Scrabble strategy book based upon the plaintiff's
17
manuscript.
In Landsberg, the plaintiff's contract claim succeeded because,
in California, novelty is irrelevant in an action seeking recovery for
the use of an idea disclosed pursuant to a contract. 18 However, California courts will not find that an implied contract exists if disclosure
of the plaintiff's idea occurs before it is known that the defendant's
use of the plaintiff's idea is conditioned upon the payment of compensation. 9 Murray also satisfied this standard because he made it
known to NBC that, if it used his idea, he expected to be given com22 0
pensation and credit as the producer of the show.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Swarth, supra note 1, at 127.
Id.
Id.
802 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1986).
Id.
Id. at 1196.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Swarth, supra note 1, at 121.
Id.
See discussion of facts supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
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A.

The Contract Theory: Unjust Enrichment

Unjust enrichment exists where a party has been enriched
"under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he
ought not to retain it. . . "221 In his article entitled, The Protection
of IntangibleInterests, 222 Edward M. Swartz focused on the inequity
inherent in predicaments like that of Murray, and suggested that
emphasis should be placed on the injury to idea creators in situations
similar to that in Murray2 2 3 He stated in pertinent part:
Equitable jurisdiction has been steadily expanding to provide protection for the whole array of intangible values .... The existence
of a legal benefit should not, in every instance, be made to depend
upon the existence of a property interest. What should be controlling is that the defendant, by injuring the plaintiff, has acquired a
benefit which in equity and good conscience should belong to the
[p]laintiff. It is apparent that intangible values can be appropriated
to [a] defendant's great benefit. Yet it is questionable whether
these interests will qualify as property. If these interests can be
called property, so much the better. However, where the court finds
that no property interest is involved, the search for legal benefit
should not stop with that determination. 224
Contract law provides a remedy for the unauthorized use of ideas.22 5
"Where an unjust enrichment has been gained, the law has adopted
the [implied-in-fact] contract to raise up an obligation in order to
promote justice. '228 Unjust enrichment allows recovery if the plaintiff can prove that the goods provided or the services rendered were
not intended as a gift, and that the plaintiff actually conferred a
benefit on the defendant.2 27 Courts have found that when a defendant uses a plaintiff's idea, the defendant implies acceptance of the
plaintiff's offer to sell the idea. 228 If the defendant accepts the offer,
then the defendant's failure to pay is a breach of the implied-in-fact
221. Miller v. Schloss, 113 N.E. 337 (N.Y. 1916) (stating that unjust enrichment "rests
upon the equitable principle that a person shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the
expense of another").
222. Swartz, supra note 28.
223. See id. at 109-10.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 125.
226. Id.
227. Miller, supra note 5, at 1020-21.
228. Robbins v. Frank Cooper Assoc., 241 N.Y.S.2d 259, 261 (App. Div. 1963), rev'd,
200 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1964).
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contract.2 2 9
At least one treatise on copyright law notes that, in most cases
where a defendant requests that the plaintiff disclose his idea, the
courts will find that such request or solicitation implies a promise to
pay for the idea if the defendant uses it.2 30 This theory has been

accepted frequently in the entertainment field. 23 1 "In the entertainment industry, television and movie studios buy ideas for shows separately from the shows themselves, even paying for unsolicited ideas if
used. 2 32 Courts infer a recipient's promise to pay based on his
knowledge of this industry practice.2 3
It has been held that industry custom provides sufficient notice
that someone submitting materials expects to be paid if the recipient
uses them.2 34 In an industry where ideas are customarily bought and
sold, "courts have found that industry custom furnishes notice to a
television or movie studio that a writer submitting a story idea expects to be paid if the studio actually uses the idea. . .. 23"
"In the absence of a sufficient industry custom, courts have inferred a promise to pay for an idea from the parties' previous negotiations [regarding] the idea.

'2

3

'

The assumption is that the creator

does not intend to bestow a gift upon the defendant.2 37 "Courts can
ensure that a defendant received a benefit by requiring proof that
the defendant actually used the idea. By actually using the submit229. Id.
230. NIMMER, supra note 48, § 16.01, at 16-3; see, e.g., Kurlan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 256 P.2d 962 (Cal. 1953) (en banc); Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 256 P.2d 947 (Cal.
1953) (en banc); American TCP Corp. v. Strauss Stores Corp., 136 N.Y.S.2d 76 (Sup. Ct.
1954), affd, 140 N.Y.S.2d 884 (App. Div. 1955).
231. See, e.g., Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enters., Ltd., 88 Cal. Rptr. 679 (Ct. App.
1970) (television series); see also NIMMER, supra note 48, § 16.01, at 16-4 (development of
contract theory to protect ideas).
232. Miller, supra note 5, at 1014 (citing Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 329 F.
Supp. 601, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)).
233. Id. (citing Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1984) (allegations that a
studio customarily returned scripts unopened if uninterested in reviewing them, and that, in
this case, the studio had forwarded the script by mailgram to its subsidiary, were sufficient to
withstand summary judgment); and Minniear v. Tors, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct. App. 1968)).
234. See id. at 1014, 1021.
235. Id. at 1021; see, e.g., Fink v. Goodson-Todman Enters., Ltd., 88 Cal. Rptr. 679
(Ct. App. 1970) (television series); Robbins v. Frank Cooper Assoc., 241 N.Y.S.2d 259, 261
(App. Div. 1963), rev'd, 200 N.E.2d 318 (N.Y. 1964) (court awarded damages only); Cole v.
Phillips H. Lord, Inc., 28 N.Y.S.2d 404 (App. Div. 1941) (radio program).
236. Miller, supra note 5, at 1014.
237. See id. at 1022. If the Murray court had looked solely at the events which had
transpired between the parties prior to the submission of the proposal, it would have arrived at
a just decision.
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ted idea, the client shows that it found value in the idea. ' 238 Benefit
to the defendant can be measured by the value to the recipient of
what was received.2 39
Actual use can be shown indirectly. 4 ° Whether the benefit a
prospective client has wrought from submitted work is services, property, or something in between, the defendant's receipt of something
valuable may be shown by the defendant's actual use. For example,
actual use was found where a "significant aspect of the final project"
was shown to be "so similar to the rejected submitted idea that it
raised an inference that the client used the submission in developing
the project."2'4 1
The requirements of novelty and concreteness are erroneously
relied upon to distinguish which ideas have value and, in turn, to
merit protection as a property right.2 42 If the defendant uses the
idea, he obviously finds the idea valuable enough. Thus, it is more
appropriate to measure an idea's value to the defendant by considering whether or not the defendant found enough value in the idea to
use it, rather than by deciding whether or not the plaintiff had a
property interest in the idea.24 3
The fact that Murray submitted his idea with the understanding
that he expected to receive credit and compensation, if the idea was
used by NBC, negated any conclusion that he intended his submission to be a gift. Additionally, the evidence clearly indicated that
NBC benefitted by its use of Murray's idea. Finally, the court's assumption that NBC used Murray's idea in the creation of The
Cosby Show should have been sufficient to satisfy the "actual use"
test to support a claim for unjust enrichment.
B.

Labor as Consideration

Some courts have relied partially on a plaintiff's services in deciding whether or not a plaintiff has property rights in particular
ideas. 4 4 In one case, the court rejected the defendant's reliance on
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See id. at 1023-24.
243. See, e.g., Swartz, supra note 28, at 110. The control should be based upon whether
the defendant acquired a benefit while injuring the plaintiff. Id. Legal benefits should not
always be based upon whether a property interest exists. Id.
244. See, e.g., Nash v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (industrial design); How J. Ryan & Assocs. v. Century Brewing Ass'n, 55 P.2d 1053 (Wash. 1936).
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Downey 24I and held that an idea cannot support a right to recovery
unless the idea is original. 4 6 In Chajet Design Group, Inc. v.
Warner/Lauren Ltd.,24 7 plaintiff prepared and submitted drawings of
a flask-like and cube-like bottle design to the defendant. 24 8 It was
implied that the plaintiff was required to use his best efforts and
professional expertise to develop and select from among the many
possible bottle designs one which would suit the needs of the defendant. 249 The defendant stated that the plaintiff's choices were unacceptable and would not be used; however, the plaintiff's design was,
in fact, used by the defendant. 50
The court held that consideration was not merely the idea itself,
but the services rendered. 51 Thus, if an idea does not constitute a
sufficient basis upon which a court might find a contractual agreement, the labor expended in procuring such an idea can meet the
requirements. The rule is that ideas are "as free as air; ' '2 5 2 this rule
can be justified on the theory that what is really bargained for is the
253
act of conveying the idea.
The excessively strict standard for protection required by New
York law was renounced long ago by the California courts. 5 4 In
California, courts base recovery for implied-in-fact contracts in the
entertainment area on the plaintiff's services in disclosing an idea. 255
For instance, in Desny v. Wilder,5 6 the Supreme.Court of California
stated:
The lawyer or doctor who applies specialized knowledge to a state
of facts and gives advice for a fee is selling and conveying an idea.
In doing that, he is rendering a service. The lawyer and doctor
have no property rights in their ideas, as such, but they do not
ordinarily convey them without solicitation by [a] client or
245.
246.
Ct. 1953).
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
Television
256.

334 N.Y.S.2d 874 (N.Y. 1972).
Chajet Design Group, Inc. v. Warner/Lauren Ltd., 124 N.Y.S.2d 319, 320 (Sup.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 275-77.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 278.
NIMMER, supra note 48, § 16.01, at 16-2.
Id.
Swartz, supra note 28, at 122.
See, e.g., Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1956) (en banc); Donahue v. Ziv
Programs, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1966).
299 P.2d 257.
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patient." 7

In Desny the plaintiff telephoned the defendant, a writer-producer
for Paramount Pictures Corporation, on a number of occasions and
described his idea for a story to the defendant's secretary, at the
secretary's insistence.2"8 After the plaintiff completely divulged his
idea to the defendant's secretary, the secretary said that she would
talk it over with the defendant. 5 9 The plaintiff explained that the
story idea cost him a great deal of time and effort and, therefore, 26if0
the defendant wanted to use the idea he would have to pay for it.
idea; however, no comThe defendant ended up using the plaintiff's
2 61
plaintiff.
the
to
provided
was
pensation
The Desny court stated that "a compiler who merely gathers
and arranges, in some concrete form, materials which are open and
accessible to all who have the mind to work with like diligence is as
much the owner of the result of his labors as if his work were a
creation rather than a construction. 2 6 2 Under the reasoning in
Desny, any creator is not automatically disqualified from protection
simply because elements of his idea have been previously used. One
commentator concludes that "[i]ntangible interests should receive
the same treatment as is traditionally reserved for tangible interests,
and the courts and attorneys alike should be ever vigilant to ensure,
where possible, that incorporeal as well as corporeal rights receive

equal protection. "263
VI.

CONCLUSION

Murray demonstrates the maltreatment of an idea creator by a
powerful defendant through New York's legal system. If future cases
are similarly analyzed, New York will cease to benefit from the labors of its creative citizens. Instead, these people will create, construct, innovate, and develop their ideas in jurisdictions in which
their ideas may flourish and rights be protected at the same time.
In a larger sense, the effect of minimal protection of the creation of new ideas can be very detrimental. "[W]e must take care to
guard against ...[the possibility] . . .that men of ability, who have
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 266.
Id. at 261-62.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 272.
Swartz, supra note 28, at 129.
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employed their time for the service of the community, may not be
deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and
labour ... "264 It appears that, unless an idea creator, who has put
great effort and dedication into an idea, is assured of his rights in
that idea, he will lose faith in the ability of the legal system to protect him from the theft of his accomplishment.
Murray's creativity was grossly exploited, and as a result, NBC
was able to unjustly benefit from Murray's idea and property.
Clearly, Judge Cedarbaum legitimized NBC's unjust enrichment
when she granted the motion for summary judgment.26 If the lack
of protection the court provided for Murray becomes the rule rather
than the exception, progress of the arts will be inhibited, and the
world may be deprived of future artistic innovations. Let Murray
instead be used to demonstrate that judicial decisions occasionally
merit reversal, and that New York laws which impose incredible obstacles in the path of the idea creator must be changed.
Kim Radbell

264. Swarth, supra note 1, at 116 (quoting Justice Mansfield in Cary v. Longman, 102
Eng. Rep. 138, 139-40 n.b (1785) (reprinting Sayre v. Moore)).
265. See Murray v. National Broadcasting Co., 671 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).

